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Suriya yoki Turkiyadan o'lpon olib yuruvchi

Suriya yoki Turkiyadan o'lpon olib yuruvchi


Suriya va Turkiyani boshqargan hindu qirollari!

London Swaminathan tomonidan yozilgan tadqiqot qog'ozi
1341 -sonli tadqiqot maqolasi, 2014 yil 11 oktyabr.

Hindiston tarixi kitoblarini yozgan chet ellik "olimlar" hind tarixining ba'zi ulug'vor boblarini qasddan yashirishgan — Janubi -Sharqiy Osiyo mamlakatlarida hindlarning 1500 yillik hukmronligi va Suriya, Turkiya va Iroqda hindlarning 2000 yillik hukmronligi. Garchi Bogazkoy yozuvida Vedik xudolari, Misrdagi Dasarathaning Amarna harflari, sanskritcha raqamli Kikkuli ot qo'llanmasi Hindiston mustaqil bo'lishidan ancha oldin topilgan bo'lsa -da, ular bizning maktab va kollej darsliklaridan joy topa olishmagan.

Bizning tarix kitoblarini yozgan ingliz yozuvchilari Hindistonda "yutuqlari" va "rivojlanishi" haqida hindlarning hissasi va madaniy kengayishidan ko'ra ko'proq yozishgan. Ammo hozir ularni ayblashning o'rniga, biz uni tuzatishga yoki yangilashga hech qachon qiynalmagan "olimlarimizni" ayblashimiz kerak. Dunyo bo'ylab ular miloddan avvalgi 1000 yoki 2000 yillar atrofida ulug'vor tsivilizatsiyaga ega ekanliklarini aytib, o'tmish tarixini yangilashgan. Hindiston tarixida Mauryan sulolasi va Hind vodiysi o'rtasida katta farq bor. Marksist va dravidlik olimlar juda baxtli! Ular Megasthenes va Hindu Puranalar tomonidan qayd etilgan 153 avlodning hech birini tan olmagan.

Suriya va Turkiyadagi ulug'vor hindu hukmronligi haqida o'qish kech emas.

Miloddan avvalgi 1600 yildan 1200 yilgacha Yaqin Sharqning yirik davlatlari urush va diplomatiya orqali mintaqani nazorat qilish uchun kurashdilar. Bu davr haqidagi ko'p ma'lumotimiz 18 -chi sulolaning Misr hukmdorlari va ularning qo'shnilari o'rtasidagi yozishmalarni o'z ichiga olgan loydan yasalgan planshetlar to'plami bo'lgan Amarna xatlaridan kelib chiqadi. Ular boshqa narsalar qatorida Mitanni (Amarna Misrda) borligini ochib beradi.

Amarna harflari III va IV Amenofis (Akhenaten) va Tutanxamon (miloddan avvalgi 1390—1327) hukmronligi davriga to'g'ri keladi. O'sha davrning diplomatik tili bo'lgan akkad tilida mixxat yozuvida yozilgan, ularga knyaz knyazlari va Yaqin Sharq mintaqalaridan kelgan xatlar kiradi. Maktublarda biz hukmdorlarning bir -birlariga sovg'alar yuborishlarini va ba'zan Amenofis III va Mitanni Tushratta (Dasaratha) qizi Taduhepa o'rtasidagi sulolaviy nikohga kirayotganlarini ko'ramiz.

Tushratta kuyoviga shunday deb yozgan edi: "Men seni akamga sovg'a qilib, beshta arava va beshta ot bo'yinturug'ini yubordim, va opam Taduhepaga sovg'a qilib, men oltin -tovoqlar, bir juft oltin sirg'a yubordim. ... va xudojo'y toshlar ". Amenofis III vafotidan keyin Taduhepa o'g'li Akhenatenga uylandi.
Tushratta Misr fir'avnini davolash uchun Naynavalik Ishtar haykallarini ikki marta Misrga yuborgan. (Ishtar - Durga ma'budasi. Chet ellik yozuvchilar har doim asl ismlar o'rniga ma'lum ekvivalentlarini berishadi. Hamma yunon yozuvchilari hindular Shiva/Indra va Vishnu ma'nosida Baxus va Gerkulesga sajda qilishgan deb yozishgan)

Mitanni (Mitranya Desa) tarixda miloddan avvalgi 1480 yilda, Parrattarna (Pratardhana) Suriyada Halabni boshqargan paytda paydo bo'lgan, miloddan avvalgi XV asrning oxiriga kelib, Saushatar Ossuriyani Mitaniya nazorati ostiga olgan. Tushratta miloddan avvalgi 1340 yilda o'g'li tomonidan o'ldirilgan. U mustaqil Mitanni oxirgi qiroli edi. Uning shohligi xet va ossuriyaliklar tomonidan vayron qilingan. Xet poytaxti Xattusadan olingan hujjatda Tushrattaning o'g'li Shattiwaza Mitanni hukmdori xet vassali sifatida tan olingan bitim yozilgan. Mitanni poytaxti Vashukanni (Vedik Xudo Vasu) deb nomlangan.
Shimoliy Mesopotamiya va Suriyadagi kuchli Hurrian (Surya Vamsa Hurrian = Suryan)) shtati (Surya nomi bilan atalgan, hind quyosh xudosi), Mitanni birinchi marta miloddan avvalgi XV asr boshlariga mansub qabr yozuvida eslatib o'tilgan va oxirgi marta tasdiqlangan. miloddan avvalgi 1115—1077-Ossuriya shohi Tiglat-pilesar.

Mitanni nomi Iroqdagi Nuzidan ma'lum bo'lgan maiita (Quyosh uchun MITRA) ismidan kelib chiqqan. Bogazkoy yozuvida Mitran tinchlik shartnomasida Mitra haqida so'z borgani uchun, shubhasiz, u Vedik xudosi MITRAni bildiradi. Hurriya ham Surya = Quyosh = Mitra.
Mitra, Surya, Xurya, Sulaymon, Sulaymon, Shulman bir xil (H = S)

Mitanni geografik Maittani nomiga aylandi. Shtat hurriy tilida Hurri, Ossuriya tilida Xanigalbat va boshqa matnlarda, Bobil tilida Xabigalbat va Misr tilida Naharina yoki Nahrima nomi bilan ham tanilgan.
Sanskritcha so'z Nagara = Nagarika = Shahar aholisi, Madaniyatli, dabdabali

Olimlar uning poytaxti Vashukanni aniqlay olmadilar va topa olmadilar. Uning Tell Fekherie bilan identifikatsiyasi bahsli. Miloddan avvalgi XV asr o'rtalariga kelib, Mitanni O'rta er dengizigacha cho'zilgan Iroq, Turkiya va Suriyaning ko'p qismini bosib oldi. Uning shohlari Misr va Xattiga qarshi kampaniya olib borishdi va oxir -oqibat ular bilan tinchlik shartnomalarini imzoladilar.

Miloddan avvalgi XV asrda shisha ishlab chiqarishni Mitanni bilan bog'lash kerak, deb bahs yuritildi va eng yaxshi erta oynalar Iroqdagi Nuziydan keladi.
Mitannian Misr bilan aloqa qilgandan so'ng, biz Misr qirolliklari orasida ko'plab sanskrit ismlarini ko'ramiz. Tutankamenning rafiqasi Ankenan edi. Bu Anjana yoki Angananing buzilgan shakli (Surangana = Sura+ angana = Devalokaning ayoli)

Mitanni Kings sof sanskrit nomlari bilan
Kirta (miloddan avvalgi 1500 yil) = Kreta/Crown yoki Kirti = Shuhrat
Shuttarna = Sudxana yoki Sudxarsana (Gautama Buddaning otasining ismi Sudxodana edi)
Paratarna = Vishnu Sahsranamadagi Pratardhana
Shaushtatara = Suakadxara (toza?)
Artatama = Rudra Daman (mil. 130-150), Arta Daman yoki Arta Dxarma singari
Shuttarna II
Artashumara = Arta Kumara
Artatama II
Shuttarna III
Shattivaza/ Kirtiwasa = Sathya vakya, Sathya Vacha, Kirti Vacha, Krittivasan - Lord Shiva nomi
Shattuvara = Satvavara yoki Sathyavaran
Vasashatta = Vasu satva yoki Satya
Shattuara II =

(Hindiston singari, katta otaning ismi yoki buyuk otasining ismi takrorlangan. Pandyas Maran va Sadayan Maravarman va Jadavarman bilan almashgan)


Dasaratha Misr Paharoiga maktub

Hindlar migratsiyasi
Vedalar ko'p joylarda Pancha Jana (beshta qabila) haqida gapiradilar. Besh qabiladan Druhyus G'arbiy Osiyoga ko'chib kelgan odamlar edi. Endi biz buning uchun Rig Vedaning 8 -Mandalasidan ko'plab dalillarni olamiz. Ismlar Iroq va Eron nomlari bilan bog'liq. Bu miloddan avvalgi 2000 yilgacha sodir bo'lishi kerak edi.
"Indra Urga Sumeriyada hujum uyushtirganmi?" Xabarimda men Vediklarning Mesopotamiya (Iroq) bilan aloqasi uchun etarli dalillarni keltirganman.

Eski ma'lumotnoma:
Men Indus vodiysi ostida Misrga yuborgan maqolam: Lapiz lazuli Export:
“Misr bilan Turkiya va Suriyaning hind podshohlari o'rtasidagi aloqa yaxshi hujjatlashtirilgan. Amarna harflarining loydan yasalgan planshetlari tufayli biz bilamizki, Dasarathaning qizi Taduhepa (Datta shivaa) Misrlik Amenofis III ga uylangan. Miloddan avvalgi 1380 yillarda Dasarata Suriya va Turkiyani boshqargan. Miloddan avvalgi 1340 yilda u o'ldirilgan. Mitanni podshohlari Vedik dinga ergashgani Bogazkoy yozuvi bilan tasdiqlangan, bu erda to'rt asosiy Vedik xudolari tinchlik shartnomasida tilga olingan. Pratardhana - Vishnu sahasranamadagi ism - hozir Suriyada Halabni boshqargan. Loydan qilingan lavhalarga ko'ra, miloddan avvalgi 1480 yildan boshlab Turkiya va Suriyani Vedik shohlari boshqargan.

Dasaratha Amenofisga beshta aravani, beshta otni, zargarlik buyumlarini, bir juft oltin uzukni va yaxshi toshlarni yubordi, deydi Amarna maktublaridan birida. Bizda miloddan avvalgi 1400 yillarga yaqin sanskritcha ismlar va ot qo'llanmasi bor. O'z qizini qo'shni mamlakat shohi bilan turmushga chiqarish - hindlarning odatiy odati bo'lib, undan keyin qirollar Kanyakumaridan Kashmirgacha va undan tashqarida. Afg'onistonlik Gandxari va eronlik Kaykeyi Drudharashtra va Dasarathaga uylanishgan, chunki o'sha paytlarda bu mamlakatlarning hammasini hindular boshqargan.

(Mitannian Dasaratha Ramayana Dasarathadan farq qiladi. Tamillar singari, sanskrit tilidagi so'zlarni tamillashtirganidek, mitaniyaliklar ham Dasarathani Tushratta, Pratardhana Parartana deb yozishgan. Hozir ham Shri -Lankalik Tamillar Damayantini Tamayanti deb yozadilar. Mavrikiy Tamillar hali ham yomonroq va ular Sampramanya deb yozishadi) Frantsuz ta'siri. Yunon yozuvchisi, xitoy visorlari va ingliz hukmdorlari hamma joy nomlari va odamlarning nomlarini tanib bo'lmaydigan darajada buzib ko'rsatdilar. Chiroyli Aralvaymozi Aramboliga, Tarangampadi Tranqbarga, Tutukkudi Tutikoringa, Aleksandr esa Alikasundaga aylandi.)

Kikkuli (Aswa Sena) tomonidan yozilgan ot qo'llanmasi loydan yasalgan planshetlarda 1080 qatorgacha ishlaydi. Garchi u xet tilida yozilgan bo'lsa -da, Aika, Tera, Pancha, Satta, Nava vartaana raqamlari (1,3,5,7,9 intervallari) va ranglar uchun so'zlar sanskrit tilida.

Qo'llaniladigan kitoblar: Britaniya muzeyi tomonidan Yaqin Sharq lug'ati, Vaqt jahon tarixi, A. Kalyanaraman tomonidan Arya Tanagini va Vikipediya.)


Bog'liq

Larisa Epatko PBS NewsHour uchun tashqi aloqalarga bag'ishlangan multimediali veb -funksiyalar va reportajlar tayyorladi. U Iordaniya, Pokiston, Iroq, Gaiti, Sudan, G'arbiy Sahara, Guantanamo, Xitoy, Vetnam, Janubiy Koreya, Turkiya, Germaniya va Irlandiya kabi joylarda hisobot berdi.

Kirish qutisini o'rgating

Bu erda & rsquos Shartnomasiga obuna bo'ling, bizning siyosat byulletenlarini siz tahlil qilib, boshqa joydan topasiz.


Nega Suriyada fuqarolar urushi bor?

Butun Suriya mamlakatini va uning qo'shnilarini vayron qilgan Suriyadagi fuqarolar urushi bir necha davlatlar, isyonchi guruhlar va terrorchilik tashkilotlari ishtirokidagi murakkab to'qnashuvdir.

2011 yilda zo'ravonliksiz norozilik sifatida boshlangan voqea tezda keng miqyosli urushga aylandi. Jang boshlanganidan buyon 򠑰,000 dan ortiq odam halok bo'ldi, 1 milliondan ortiq kishi yaralandi va millionlab odamlar uylarini tashlab qochqinlar sifatida yashashga majbur bo'ldi.

Arab bahori fuqarolar urushini qo'zg'atgan uchqunmi?

Garchi ko'plab murakkab sabablar Suriyadagi fuqarolar urushiga olib kelgan bo'lsa -da, "Arab bahori" deb nomlanuvchi bir voqea, ehtimol, mojaroning eng muhim qo'zg'atuvchisi sifatida ajralib turadi.

2011 yil boshida Misr va Tunisda qator siyosiy va iqtisodiy namoyishlar boshlandi. Arab bahori deb nomlangan bu muvaffaqiyatli qo'zg'olonlar Suriyadagi demokratiya tarafdorlari uchun ilhom manbai bo'lib xizmat qildi.

Ammo o'sha yilning mart oyida arab bahoridan ilhomlangan grafiti yozgan 15 suriyalik maktab o'quvchisi hibsga olingan va qiynoqqa solingan. O'g'illardan biri o'ldirildi.

Hibsga olishlar butun Suriya bo'ylab norozilik va namoyishlarga sabab bo'ldi. Fuqarolar qolgan bolalarni qo'yib yuborishni, mamlakatdagi barcha insonlar uchun katta erkinliklarni talab qildilar.

Ammo prezident Bashar al-Assad boshchiligidagi hukumat bunga javoban yuzlab namoyishchilarni o'ldirdi va hibsga oldi. Shok va g'azab butun Suriya bo'ylab yoyila boshladi va ko'pchilik Asadning iste'fosini talab qildi. U rad etgach, uning tarafdorlari va muxoliflari o'rtasida urush boshlandi.

Suriya hukumati namoyishchilarni o'qqa tutishni to'xtatishi, tinch namoyishlarga siyosiy mahbuslarni qo'yib yuborishi va nohaq hibsga olishni to'xtatishi, inson huquqlari kuzatuvchilariga Dara 𠆚 kabi shaharlarga kirishiga va demokratik o'tishni jadallashtirish uchun jiddiy muloqot boshlashiga imkon berishi kerak. Obama 2011 yilgi nutqida shunday dedi.

Aks holda, Prezident Assad va uning rejimiga qarshi kurash davom etadi va chet elda izolyatsiya qilinadi, dedi Obama. 2011 yil iyul oyiga kelib suriyalik isyonchilar Ozod Suriya armiyasini tuzdilar va fuqarolar urushi yaqinlashdi.

Suriya Prezidenti Bashar Asad.

Ulrich Baumgarten Getty Images orqali

Assad ’sga qarshi kurash Suriyani qiynayotgan bir nechta muammolardan biridir.

Arab bahoridan ilhomlangan voqeadan oldin ham, ko'plab Suriya fuqarolari hukumatning qobiliyatsizligidan, odamlarning erkinliklari yo'qligidan va o'z mamlakatlarida umumiy yashash sharoitlaridan norozi bo'lishgan.

Assad 2000 yilda otasi vafotidan keyin prezident bo'ldi. Bir qancha inson huquqlari tashkilotlari rahbarni prezidentlik davrida siyosiy raqiblarini qiynoqqa solishda va o'ldirishda ayblashgan.

Qolgan iqtisodiyot, yuqori ishsizlik, hukumat korruptsiyasi va kuchli qurg'oqchilik Assad davrida odamlar orasida norozilikni keltirib chiqargan boshqa muammolar edi.

Yana bir muammo mamlakatdagi keskin diniy muhit edi: Suriyaliklarning aksariyati sunniy musulmonlar, lekin Suriya hukumatida shia alaviy mazhabining a'zolari hukmron. Ikki guruh o'rtasidagi taranglik butun Suriyada va Yaqin Sharqdagi boshqa davlatlarda davom etayotgan muammodir.

Turli xil belgilar kombinatsiyasi vaziyatni murakkablashtiradi.

Urush boshlanganidan beri Suriyadagi vaziyat ancha murakkablashdi, chunki rasmga boshqa davlatlar va uyushgan jangchilar kirgan.

Aslida, Suriya hukumati va#x2019 ning asosiy qo'llab -quvvatlovchilari Rossiya, Eron va "Hizbulloh" (Livanda joylashgan militsiya guruhi). AQSh, Saudiya Arabistoni, Qatar, Turkiya va boshqa g'arbiy davlatlar mo''tadil isyonchi guruhlarning tarafdorlari sifatida tasvirlangan. Urush boshlanganidan beri ko'plab yangi isyonchi guruhlar paydo bo'ldi.

Davom etayotgan mojaro, shuningdek, IShID va Al-Qoida kabi terrorchi tashkilotlarni tartibsizlikka qo'shilishga undadi. Bu guruhlar asosan sunniy jangarilardan iborat.

Isyonchilar va Assad kuchlari IShIDga qarshi alohida kurash olib borishdi, bir -biriga qarshi urush olib borishdi. Dinamikani yanada murakkablashtirish uchun Qo'shma Shtatlar 2014 yildan buyon IShID maqsadlariga qarshi xalqaro bombardimonlik kampaniyasini boshqargan.

2017 va 2018 yil aprel oyida Qo'shma Shtatlar Suriyadagi kimyoviy qurollarga qarshi harbiy hujumlarni boshladi. Assad ’ ning idorasi 2017-yilgi hujumlarga qarshi chiqdi va o'z bayonotida shunday dedi: "Amerika qilgan ishi-bu aqlsiz va mas'uliyatsiz xatti-harakat, xolos.

2018 -yilgi hujumdan keyin AQSh prezidenti Donald Tramp matbuotga shunday dedi: & quot; Bizning tungi harakatlarimizdan maqsad - kimyoviy qurol ishlab chiqarish, tarqatish va ishlatishga qarshi kuchli himoya vositasini o'rnatish. Ushbu to'siqni o'rnatish AQShning milliy xavfsizligi uchun muhim manfaatdir. Bu vahshiyliklarga Amerika, Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiyaning qo'shma javobi milliy kuchimizning harbiy, iqtisodiy va diplomatik vositalarini birlashtiradi. ”

Bu mojaro gumanitar va qochqinlar inqirozini keltirib chiqardi.

Ekspertlarning hisob -kitoblariga ko'ra, 13,1 million suriyalik dori yoki oziq -ovqat kabi gumanitar yordamga muhtoj. Bu odamlarning qariyb 3 millioni borish qiyin bo'lgan hududlarda yashaydi.

5,6 milliondan ortiq qochqinlar mamlakatni tark etishdi, yana 6,1 millioni Suriya hududida o'z uylarini tashlab ketishdi. Turkiya, Livan va Iordaniya eng ko'p suriyalik qochqinlarni qabul qilgan.

Suriyaliklar 2015 yilning 30 avgustida isyonchilar qo'lidagi Douma hududida rejim kuchlari tomonidan uyushtirilgan havo hujumlari natijasida vayron bo'lgan binolar xarobalari orasida yurishmoqda.

Abd Doumany/AFP/Getty Images

Vaziyat yomon, zo'ravonlik davom etmoqda.

2018 yil sentyabr oyiga kelib, Asad va uning boshqa kuchlari mamlakatning eng yirik shaharlarining ko'p qismini nazoratni qaytarib olishdi, garchi mamlakatning "xA0" qismlari hali ham isyonchi va jihodchi guruhlar va kurdlar boshchiligidagi SDF alyansi qo'lida edi.   shimoli-g'arbiy Idlib viloyati.  ISIS ’ ning Suriyadagi mavjudligi ancha kamaygan.

2014 yildan beri Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti Jeneva -2 jarayoni deb nomlanuvchi tinchlik muzokaralarining to'qqiz raundini o'tkazdi. Bu aralashuvga qaramay, ozgina yutuqlarga erishildi.

2014 yilda muzokaralar muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchraganidan so'ng, BMT vositachisi Laxdar Braximi o'z bayonotida Suriya xalqidan kechirim so'radi va shunday dedi: "Afsuski, hukumat rad etdi, bu esa muxolifatning shubhasini keltirib chiqarmoqda, aslida hukumat bu masalalarni muhokama qilmoqchi emas". tana) umuman ", dedi u.

Suriya hukumati ham, isyonchilar ham tinchlik shartlari to'g'risida kelishmoqchi emas. Agar hech narsa o'zgarmasa, urushdan vayron bo'lgan dunyoning bu hududi, ehtimol, ko'proq zo'ravonlik va beqarorlik maydoniga aylanadi.


Kurdlar kimlar?

Kurdlar-Yaqin Sharqdagi ettinchi yirik etnik guruh. Ularning soniga qaramay, ular vatani Turkiya, Iroq, Suriya, Eron va Armaniston bo'ylab cho'zilgan, fuqaroligi bo'lmagan va ko'pincha chetda qolgan odamlardir.

Birinchi jahon urushi va Usmonli imperiyasi qulaganidan so'ng, ko'plab kurdlar mustaqil kurd davlatini qurishga harakat qilishdi va Kurdistonni yaratish bo'yicha dastlabki shartnomalarda va'da berildi. Ammo oxir -oqibat mintaqa bo'linib bo'lgach, millat hech qachon amalga oshmadi.

O'tgan yillar mobaynida millatga bo'lgan ko'plab urinishlar barham topdi.


Qo'shma Shtatlar bu muammoni qanday hal qilishga harakat qildi?

Obama ma'muriyati militsionerlarning Turkiyadagi partizanlar bilan aloqalarini yo'q qilishga urinib, guruhni o'z nomini o'zgartirishga va kurd bo'lmagan boshqa jangchilarni jalb qilishga undadi. Hozirda bu guruh Suriya Demokratik Kuchlari deb nomlanadi va jangarilarining qariyb 40 foizi arab yoki boshqa millat vakillari, 2016 yilgi Amerika rasmiylari hisob -kitobiga ko'ra.

Amerika kuchlari amalda tinchlikparvarlik vazifasini bajara boshladilar, Turkiya chegarasida avval o'zlari, so'ngra turk qo'shinlari bilan birgalikda patrullik qilishdi.

So'nggi oylarda Qo'shma Shtatlar kurd hukumatini chegaradan kuchlarini olib chiqib ketishga va bir qator mudofaa istehkomlarini demontaj qilishga ko'ndirdi, bu esa Turkiyaga yaxshi niyat ko'rsatdi.


Nima uchun kurdlar IShIDga qarshi kurashning boshida turgan?

2013 yil o'rtalarida "Islomiy davlat" (IShID) jihodchi guruhi o'z nazorati ostida Suriya shimolida joylashgan chegaradagi uchta kurd anklaviga qaradi. U 2014 yil o'rtalariga qadar Suriya Kurd Demokratik Ittifoqi partiyasi (PYD) qurolli qanoti Xalqni himoya qilish bo'linmalari (YPG) tomonidan qaytarilgan hujumlarni takrorladi.

IShIDning 2014 yil iyun oyida Iroqning shimolida amalga oshirgan hujumi, bu mamlakat va#27 kurdlarni ziddiyatga tortdi. Iroq hukumati va Kurdiston muxtoriyati Peshmerga qo'shinlarini Iroq armiyasi tashlab ketgan hududlarga yubordi.

2014 yil avgust oyida jihodchilar kutilmaganda hujum uyushtirdilar va peshmerlar bir necha hududlardan chekinishdi. Diniy ozchiliklar yashaydigan bir qancha shaharlar qulab tushdi, xususan Sinjar, IShID jangarilari minglab yazidiylarni o'ldirgan yoki asir olgan.

Bunga javoban AQSh boshchiligidagi ko'p millatli koalitsiya Iroq shimoliga havo hujumlarini boshladi va Peshmerga yordam berish uchun harbiy maslahatchilarini yubordi. YPG va Turkiyada o'ttiz yil kurd muxtoriyati uchun kurashgan va Iroqda bazalari bo'lgan Kurdiston Ishchilar  Partiyasi (PKK) ham yordamga keldi.

2014 yil sentyabr oyida IShID Suriya shimolidagi kurdlarning Kobane shahri atrofidagi anklavga hujum uyushtirdi va o'n minglab odamlarni Turkiyaning yaqin chegarasidan qochishga majbur qildi. Janglar yaqin bo'lishiga qaramay, Turkiya IShID pozitsiyalariga hujum qilishdan yoki turk kurdlarining uni himoya qilish uchun o'tishiga ruxsat bermadi.

2015 yil yanvar oyida, kamida 1600 kishi halok bo'lgan jangdan so'ng, kurd qo'shinlari Kobane shahrini o'z nazoratiga qaytarishdi.

Kurdlar - Suriya demokratik kuchlari alyansi bayrog'i ostida bir qancha mahalliy arab qo'shinlari bilan jang qilishgan va AQSh boshchiligidagi koalitsiya havo hujumlari, qurol -yarog 'va maslahatchilarining yordami bilan - keyin IShIDni o'n minglab kvadrat kilometrlik hududdan doimiy ravishda quvib chiqarishgan. shimoliy-sharqiy Suriyada va Turkiya bilan chegaraning katta qismida nazorat o'rnatildi.

2017 yil oktyabr oyida SDF jangchilari IShIDning amaldagi poytaxti Raqqa shahrini egallab olishdi, keyin janubi-sharqqa qo'shni Deyr-az-Zur viloyatiga o'tdilar-bu jihodchilarning Suriyadagi so'nggi asosiy tayanch punkti.

Suriyadagi IShIDning Bag'uz qishlog'i atrofidagi so'nggi cho'ntagi 2019 yil mart oyida SDF qo'liga o'tdi. SDF "ISh" va "kalifat" ning butunlay yo'q qilinishini olqishladi, lekin u jihodchilarning uyqu kameralari saqlanib qolayotgani va katta xavf tug'dirishi haqida ogohlantirdi.

SDF, shuningdek, jangning so'nggi ikki yilida qo'lga olingan minglab gumon qilingan IShID jangarilari, shuningdek, IShID jangchilari bilan bog'liq bo'lgan o'n minglab ko'chirilgan ayollar va bolalar bilan shug'ullanish uchun qoldirildi. AQSh ular orasidagi chet el fuqarolarini vataniga qaytarishga chaqirdi, lekin ularning aksariyati o'z mamlakatlarini rad etdi.

2019 yil oktyabr oyida AQSh qo'shinlari Turkiya bilan chegaradan chekinishdi, mamlakat prezidenti, YPG jangchilaridan 32 km chuqurlikda va xavfsiz hududni o'rnatish bo'yicha operatsiyani boshlashini aytdi va 2 mln. U erda suriyalik qochqinlar. SDF AQSh tomonidan "orqada" sanchilganini "aytdi va bu hujum" IShID "ning mag'lubiyatini qaytarishi mumkinligi haqida ogohlantirdi.

Turk qo'shinlari va ittifoqchi Suriya isyonchilari operatsiyaning dastlabki kunlarida barqaror yutuqlarga erishdilar. Bunga javoban, SDF Suriya hukumatidan yordam so'rab murojaat qildi va Suriya armiyasi chegara bo'ylab joylashishi to'g'risida kelishuvga erishdi.


Turkiyaning kelib chiqishi va Suriyadagi bufer zonasi

Hamma joyda mish -mishlar, Turkiya bilan chegarada, Suriya ichida qandaydir bufer zonasi bor. Bufer zonasi tushunchasi Turkiyaning tashqi siyosatining Suriyaga - yaqin sherigidan tortib olinmaydigan dushmanga aylanishi bilan bog'liq chuqur tarixga ega. Siyosat ishlab chiqaruvchilar va kuzatuvchilar bufer zonasi yoki "havo ajratish zonasi" ning muvaffaqiyatga erishish ehtimolini o'lchashi uchun bu tarixni Turkiya nuqtai nazaridan tushunish kerak.

2002 yilda saylanganidan so'ng, Turkiyaning hukmron Adolat va taraqqiyot partiyasi (AKP) Anqaraning Suriyaning Bashar Asad bilan munosabatlariga ustuvor ahamiyat berdi. AKPning Suriyaga yondashuvi Turkiyaning sobiq tashqi ishlar vaziri va hozirgi bosh vaziri Ahmet Davutog'lu ishi bilan aniqlandi. Sobiq akademik Turkiyaning Yaqin Sharqdagi ta'sirini kengaytirish uchun Turkiyaning noyob geografiyasidan foydalanmoqchi edi. Davutog'lu Suriya kitobida bahslashdi Strategik chuqurlik, tarixiy ravishda Anadolu bilan bog'liq edi, Halab Anadolining Kahramanmaras, Gaziantep va Urfa shaharlari bilan tarixiy aloqalari tufayli Anqaraning "tabiiy ichki qismi" tarkibiga kirgan. Bu hududlar bir paytlar Usmonli imperiyasining Halab viloyatini tashkil qilgan.

Davutog'lu, Turkiya qo'shni davlatlar bilan yanada yaqinroq hamkorlik qilish uchun Nikolas J. Spikman, Ser Xelford Jon Makkinder, Alfred Mahan va Karl Xausxofer tomonidan ilgari surilgan geosiyosiy nazariyalarni qabul qilib, "markaziy davlat" sifatida harakat qilishi kerakligini ta'kidladi. Bu olimlar dunyoni G'arbiy Evropadan Arabiston yarim orolidan Osiyoga cho'zilgan "yuragi" deb nomlanuvchi, Markaziy Osiyoning ko'p qismini o'z ichiga olgan zonalarga ajratdilar. Sovuq urush davrida, Davutog'lu kuzatganidek, bu hududlar AQSh yoki Sovet Ittifoqi ta'siri ostida bo'lgan va shu tariqa Turkiyaning yaqin xorijdagi ta'sirining kengayishiga to'sqinlik qilgan.

Sovet Ittifoqining qulashi shu tariqa Davutog'lu tomonidan Turkiyaning ta'sir doirasini ushbu hayotiy muhim sohalarga kengaytirish uchun muhim imkoniyat sifatida qabul qilindi. Shu maqsadda Anqara bu nazariyalar elementlarini "strategik chuqurlik" siyosatiga kiritdi, bu siyosat Turkiyaning "markaziy davlat" vazifasini bajarishi va mintaqaning chegaralarini xiralashtirish orqali o'zining oldingi ichki hududlari bilan qayta bog'lanishini ta'kidladi. Birinchi jahon urushidan keyin Usmonli imperiyasi qulaganidan keyin sun'iy ravishda chizilgan.

Bu tasavvurni amalga oshirish uchun, Turkiya, dunyoviylikka ishongani uchun, mintaqaning boshqaruv tarixiga mos kelmaydigan, Baasizmni (Davutog'lu soxta siyosiy mafkura deb hisoblagan) qaramasdan, Suriya Prezidenti Bashar Asad bilan bo'lgan munosabatlariga juda tayandi. siyosiy qonuniylik uchun millatchilik. Davutog'lu, 1999 yilda, Yaqin Sharqda siyosiy qonuniylik tarixan tushunchadan kelib chiqqanligini yozgan Dar al -Islom -ko'pchilik musulmon va ko'pchilik musulmon bo'lmagan davlatlarda umumiy diniy identifikatsiya g'oyasi. Shunday qilib, o'z kitobida Strategik chuqurlik, u Baasizm muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchraganini va oxir -oqibat "musulmonlar ommasiga" ko'proq mos keladigan boshqaruv shakli bilan almashtirilishini ta'kidladi.

Shunday qilib, AKP Suriyada norozilik namoyishlari boshlanishidan oldin o'zining Suriya siyosatini va Bashar Asad bilan yaqin hamkorligini G'arbiy Germaniya siyosatiga o'xshash deb ta'rifladi. ostpolitik Sovuq urush davrida, Bonn Sharqiy Germaniya bilan munosabatlarni normallashtirgan. AKP vakolat muddati davomida AKP Damashq bilan bo'lgan munosabatini maqtadi. Davutog'lu buni "qo'shnilar bilan nol muammo" siyosatining ajoyib muvaffaqiyati deb ta'rifladi.

2011 yilda arab qo'zg'olonlarining Tunis, Misr, Bahrayn, Yaman va Liviyaga tarqalishi Turkiyaning siyosatiga qarshi chiqdi. ostpolitik. Misrdan boshqa har qanday holatda ham, AKP siyosiy maqomni saqlab qolishni ma'qul ko'rdi va rejimni agressiv ravishda o'zgartirishga chaqirmadi, buning o'rniga hamma narsa tugaguncha kutib turdi. Musulmon Birodarlar bilan (AKPning o'ziga xos ildizi Turkiyaning islomiy harakatida, natijada AKP va Musulmon Birodarlar o'rtasida katta mafkuraviy simpatiya mavjud).

Shunday qilib, bu Suriyada sodir bo'ldi. 2011 yil aprel oyida o'sha paytdagi Bosh vazir Rajab Toyyib Erdo'g'an, Turkiya razvedka boshqarmasi boshlig'i Davutog'lu Hakan Fidan va vazirlar mahkamasining boshqa a'zolari Suriyadagi notinchlik va Bashar Asadning kuch ishlatib, ko'cha namoyishlarini bostirish uchun muhokama qilishdi. Bu yig'ilishda AKP Assadning zo'ravonligi chidab bo'lmas ekanligiga rozi bo'ldi. Ammo muqobil - fuqarolik mojarosi - suriyalik qochqinlarning mumkin bo'lgan oqimi va Turkiyaning kurd muammosiga ta'siri va Anqaraning kurd ko'pchiligidagi millatchilik ambitsiyalaridan qo'rqishi tufayli Turkiya xavfsizligi uchun bundan ham yomonroq bo'lardi. Shu maqsadda Erdo'g'an Suriya rahbarini siyosiy islohotlar o'tkazishga ishontirish uchun Davutog'luni, keyinroq Fidanni yubordi. Bunga Suriya musulmon birodarlar tashkilotiga qo'yilgan taqiqni bekor qilish va uning rahbariyati surgundan qaytishi kiradi.

Bu urinishlar muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi. 2011 yil sentyabr oyida Turkiya Asad rejimi bilan aloqani uzdi va Qatar bilan yaqinroq ishlay boshladi, muhojirlikda yashovchan Suriya muxolifati. Bu siyosat Turkiyaning Suriya musulmon birodarlarini qo'llab-quvvatlashiga asoslangan edi, u Abu-Dabidagi Delma instituti tahlilchisi Hasan Hasanning so'zlariga ko'ra, AKPga Turkiya-Suriya chegarasida bufer zonasini tashkil etishga bosim o'tkazishga va'da bergan. Suriya armiyasi zobitlarini tark etishga sodiqlik garovi uchun qaytish. Bu zobitlar keyinchalik Ozod Suriya armiyasida birinchi isyonchilar brigadalarini tuzdilar. Turkiya bufer zonasi g'oyasini birinchi marta 2011 yil sentyabr oyida ilgari surdi, o'sha yilning noyabr oyida bu taklifni rasman ma'qulladi.

Bu taklif, Liviya inqilobi davrida Beng'ozi shahriga o'xshab, Suriya ichidagi isyonchilar uchun xavfsiz boshpana yaratishga mo'ljallangan edi. Anqara Suriya siyosiy muxolifatini bu zonaga ko'chirishni ko'zda tutgan, bu guruh Suriya qurolli muxolifati bilan qonuniyligini mustahkamlashi mumkin edi, shu bilan birga, Assad ag'darilgach, hokimiyatni tezda egallashini kutayotgan hukumat tuzish vazifasi boshlandi. O'shanda Turkiya Assad olti oydan bir yilgacha hokimiyatdan ketadi, degan fikrda edi.

Bu baho, o'z navbatida, Anqarani butun Suriyada uchish taqiqlangan hududni chaqirishni to'xtatishga undadi va buning o'rniga "bufer zonasini" - Anqara hech qachon aniq belgilab bermagan. Bu siyosat Davutog'lining 2012 yil apreldagi "tamoyil" bo'yicha "AKP xorijiy aralashuvga qarshi bo'ladi" degan fikrini aks ettirgan edi, chunki bu mintaqaning kelajagini o'z xalqi hal qilishi kerak edi.

Shunday qilib, Turkiya rasman rejimni o'zgartirish uchun havo kuchlaridan foydalanishni qo'llab -quvvatlamadi, aksincha, Liviyada amalga oshirilgan harbiy harakatlardan farqli bo'lgan aralashuvni ilgari surdi, bu esa oxir -oqibat to'g'ridan -to'g'ri havo ko'magidan foydalanishga olib keldi. Muammar Qaddafiy. To'g'risi, Turkiya taklifi AQSh boshchiligidagi rejim nishonlariga havo hujumlarini amalga oshirishga majbur bo'lardi, lekin ular ideal darajada cheklangan bo'lardi va ehtimol "nuqta mudofaasi" (ma'lum bir joyni himoya qilish) missiyasi bilan bog'liq edi. 2014 yil iyun oyida Erbilni himoya qilgan. Biroq, AQSh ikkilanib turdi va Turkiya qo'llab -quvvatlagan siyosatni qo'llab -quvvatlamadi.

2012 yilda Anqara o'z ohangini o'zgartirdi va Suriya mojarosiga ancha kengroq aralashishga undadi. Turkiya tanlagan isyonchilarni Halabga yurishga undadi. O'sha yozda, Anqara, AQSh noyabrdagi saylovlardan so'ng prezident Obamani ziddiyatga nisbatan aniqroq pozitsiyani qo'yib yuborganidan so'ng, mojaroga aralashishiga ishonchi komil edi. Biroq, Anqaraning nekbinligi uzoqni ko'ra olmadi va Prezident Obama Suriya hududida harbiy kuch ishlatishdan bosh tortdi.

Qanday bo'lmasin, AQSh saylovidan so'ng - va keyin 2013 yil 21 -avgustda Suriya rejimining kimyoviy qurol hujumidan so'ng - Turkiya keng qamrovli parvoz qilinmaydigan zonani yaratish tarafdori bo'la boshladi. 2013 yil may oyida Erdog'an va Fidan Oq uyda Prezident Obama bilan uchrashishdi va u erda AQShning Turkiya tomonidan qo'llab -quvvatlangan harbiy harakatlari borasida da'vo qilishdi. Erdo'g'an, AQShning havo hujumini, ittifoqchi davlatlar, shu jumladan Turkiya tomonidan qo'llab -quvvatlanadi, bu rejimning nishonlari va istehkomlariga zarba berib, Basharni hokimiyatdan ketishiga olib keladi. Anqara, AQSh havo kuchlarining kiritilishi Assadni "qo'llarida qon bo'lmasdan" singan Suriyani boshqarishi mumkin bo'lgan boshqa shaxs foydasiga hokimiyatdan ketishga majbur qilishi mumkinligini jimgina ta'kidladi. Bu yondashuv o'sha paytdan beri AKPning yondashuvini boshqargan va hozirda AQShning Suriyaning kelajagi borasida kelishuv nuqtasidir. Qo'shma Shtatlar aralashishdan bosh tortdi, buning o'rniga Turkiya o'zining chegara siyosati va salafiy Ahrar ash-Shom va ba'zi hollarda "Al-Qoida" ga aloqador "Jabhat an-Nusra" kabi ba'zi isyonchi guruhlarni qo'llab-quvvatlash tarixini tan olmadi.

Havo kuchlaridan foydalanish borasidagi kelishmovchilik o'shandan beri keskinlashdi. "Islomiy davlat" ning (IShID nomi bilan ham tanilgan) ko'tarilishi va uning Iroqqa hujumi natijasida, G'arbning IShIDga qaratilgan havo kampaniyasi cheklangan, lekin u bilan ishlashning cheklangan qoidalari bilan boshqarilgan. Qo'shma Shtatlar IShIDni yo'q qilishni birinchi o'ringa qo'ygan bo'lsa, Anqara bu guruh Bashar al-Assadning Suriyadagi "botqog'ida" boshpana topgan "chivin" ga o'xshashligini ta'kidladi. Shunday qilib, chivinni o'ldirish uchun "botqoqni to'kish" kerak. Shunday qilib, Anqara Suriya va Iroq ichidagi to'g'ridan -to'g'ri harbiy harakatlarda ishtirokini rejim nishonlarini o'z ichiga olgan havo hujumlarini kengaytirish bilan shartladi.

Turkiyaning ta'kidlashicha, hozirgi missiya Iroqqa qaratilgan va Suriyadagi hozirgi havo kampaniyasi Suriyadagi fuqarolar urushini yanada kengroq hal qilish uchun sharoit yaratishdan ko'ra, bilvosita Asadga kuch beradi. Anqara fikricha, IShIDning "tanazzuli" Asad rejimiga guruh tomonidan bo'shatilgan hududlarga ko'chib o'tishga imkon beradi va shu tariqa Turkiya qo'llab-quvvatlaydigan isyonchilarni mag'lub etish uchun shart-sharoit yaratadi. O'z navbatida, Turkiya bufer zonasini yana bir bor Suriya va Iroqdagi IShID tahdidiga qarshi kurashda "keng qamrovli strategiyasi" deb hisoblaydi, shu bilan birga Asadga qarshi isyonchilarga boshpana beradi.

2014 yil oktyabr oyida Anqara o'z chegarasi bo'ylab xavfsiz hudud yaratish bo'yicha yangilangan taklif xaritasini e'lon qildi. During that same month, Davutoğlu indicated Turkey’s willingness to introduce ground troops into Syria, albeit under strict rules of engagement (directives that governs how a military will use force, or operate in a conflict zone), presumably linked to the enforcement of the safe zone by American air power. The plan, however, was a bit puzzling.

First, the map did not include Aleppo, which Ankara has subsequently made clear should be protected from regime attacks. Second, the map included Kobane—a Kurdish-majority town on the Turkish-Syrian border. Kobane nearly fell to ISIL in October, before increased coalition air strikes and an emergency U.S. airdrop of weapons and medical aid (which Turkey did not support) helped stop the ISIL advance. Turkey chose not to intervene in the still ongoing battle for Kobane, owing to the fact that the town has been governed and fought for by the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—the sister party to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The Kurdish challenge and the buffer zone

The PYD has controlled three non-contiguous areas in Syria (Afrin, Kobane, and Jazira, known collectively as Rojava) since July 2012. Since then, Turkish authorities have kept their border gates with these areas closed. Ankara has also pressured the PYD to join the Syrian opposition, ostensibly as part of a broader collation of Kurdish political parties, supported by Masoud Barzani– the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, who Ankara prefers to other Kurdish leaders. Thus far, the PYD has refused, citing the dominance of Turkish supported Islamists among the Syrian rebellion and its discomfort with Barzani’s politics.

In response to the Kobane crisis, the AKP subtly changed tactics and sought to link the issue to its on-going negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan – the imprisoned leader of the PKK. As part of the peace-process, which Turkey has pursued intermittently since 2009, the AKP has demanded that PKK fighters in Turkey disarm, or withdraw to Iraqi Kurdistan. The PKK has done neither, owing to the slow pace of negotiations with the Turkish state. In turn, AKP officials quietly began to argue that if the PKK had disarmed, the Turkish government would not have had a problem with some sort of limited Kurdish autonomy in Syria. However, so long as the PKK refused to disarm, the threat posed by a possible resumption of Turkish-Kurdish hostility prevented cooperation with the PYD.

Ankara’s latest argument is a bit disingenuous, owing to the fact that in October 2014, Fidan is reported to have told Salih Muslim, a high level PYD official, that in return for Turkish support, the group must end its bid for autonomy in Syria, distance itself from the PKK, and integrate its forces with those of the Free Syrian Army. These demands are untenable for the group.

Ankara’s plan, therefore, envisioned the fall of Kobane and then the incorporation of the city—which would presumably entail the ousting of ISIL via Turkish supported military means—in to its proposed safe zone. Third, Turkey left the areas surrounding the ISIL-controlled town of Tel Abyad out of its proposal, which—like Kobane—is near the Turkish border, but included the ISIL-occupied and controlled town of Jarabulus. As such, Ankara was sending mixed signals about its intent to combat ISIL directly or to allow for air strikes to degrade the group in certain areas. In the cases of Jarabulus and Kobane (assuming the town fell), for example, the plan suggested direct combat for Turkish troops, backed by coalition air power, to uproot and force out ISIL. However, in Tel Abyad, which is sandwiched between Kobane and the Kurdish controlled canton of Jazira, no such military action was envisioned. Ankara neither explained these discrepancies, nor outlined its proposed rules of engagement for Turkish troops, with Erdoğan choosing only to say that ground forces are needed to defeat ISIL.

This plan was contingent on a fundamental shift in the tactics adopted by the United States and the Arab coalition partners operating over Syria. Ankara does not have the capability to independently enforce a large contiguous no fly zone thus it requires the United States to help sustain – and ultimately protect – any proposed area. At the time of writing, the United States has rejected Ankara’s request on numerous occasions, going as far as to say in October “that the American-led coalition, with its heavy rotation of flights and airstrikes, has effectively imposed a no-fly zone over northern Syria already.” Against this backdrop, John Allen, Brett McGurk, and Vice President Joe Biden have travelled to Turkey to more closely coordinate the American strategy with that of Turkey’s. After each meeting, both sides tout the convergence of interests in defeating ISIL, but U.S. and Turkish officials admit that the buffer zone issue remains a key sticking point.

Can Washington and Ankara agree?

Early this month, U.S. officials leaked details about a recent discussion about “the creation of a protected zone along a portion of the Syrian border that would be off-limits to Assad regime aircraft and would provide sanctuary to Western-backed opposition forces and refugees.” The proposal calls for the creation of an “air-exclusion zone” that differs little from the current status quo and does not envision any strikes on Syrian air defense systems. Instead, the defense of the zone would rely on a warning sent to Assad to stay away from coalition aircraft operating along the border and, in the event of a violation, the use of long-range air launched weapons to strike Syrian aircraft. The proposal, according to the Wall Street Journal, does not include the city of Aleppo and would rely on Turkish soldiers to identify targets for aircraft. (It also does not address artillery and the exact location of this zone has not yet been released.) However, there are concerns about whether these soldiers are up to the task and have the requisite training to act as joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) – soldiers on the ground that have the training to call in precision strikes to support ground forces.

The AKP, in turn, was surprised by the leaks with one senior researcher at a government-aligned think tank, to wonder (in a private conversation with me last week) whether the timing of the leak about the zone was intended to embarrass Erdoğan before a high-profile meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In any case, the proposal, as envisioned, does little to address Ankara’s key demands. President Erdoğan has recently weighed in on the leaks, saying the only areas of convergence with the United States are about a proposed program to train 2,000 rebels in Turkey, but that “no commitment has yet been given by the coalition powers, particularly about a no-fly zone and safe zone.”

To be sure, Erdoğan is stretching the truth: Turkey has been supportive of a phased transition in Damascus that envisions the maintenance of certain regime figures since the summer of 2011. In this regard, Turkey and the United States do share a similar point of view about the future of Syria. However, on the key issue of the no-fly-zone, the two sides remain at odds. The coalition, it appears, is taking steps to side-step the Turkish veto on the use of its bases and has begun to move more aircraft to bases in Jordan and Kuwait, as well as inside Iraq to support the anti-ISIL mission.

If Ankara agrees to the “air defense zone” it would represent a serious concession on the part of the AKP. Moreover, Ankara remains wedded to its own Syria policy and it is unlikely that the AKP would give up its most important bargaining chip — the usage of air bases in Turkey — for a plan that the AKP does not support. This suggests continued disagreement about the no fly zone in the near future.

Aaron Stein is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He blogs at Turkey Wonk va Arms Control Wonk. Follow him on Twitter @aaronstein1.


Turkey — History and Culture

One of the most intriguing destinations on the planet, Turkish history goes back a long way because of the country’s unique Eurasian position on the map. As a result, There are Ottoman, Roman, and ancient sites here, not to mention a host of modern marvels to keep things interesting.

Tarix

Turkey has a settled history that dates back more than 4,000 years, making it one of the longest surviving civilizations in the world. However, modern Turkey really began after the fall of the Ottoman Empire post-WWI. The Ottomans took control of the Anatolian Peninsula during the 15th century, and their authority over the region lasted until the empire’s decline in the 19th and 20th century.

The Ottoman Empire fought on the side of the Central Powers during WWI, and although they were eventually defeated, millions of people from minority populations such as the Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians were displaced from their homes and killed, which is still denied by the Turkish government today. After the war, the Allied Powers occupied the area, prompting the Turkish Nationalist Movement in 1918.

The War of Independence saw the Turkish Nationalist Movement finally succeed in expelling foreign authorities in 1922, leading to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, who moved the capital from Istanbul to Ankara. The War of Independence Museum (Karsiyaka Mh. Cumhuriyet Cd 14, Ankara) has plenty of historical information about this event. Mustafa Kemal was given the title “Ataturk,” which means Father of the Turks, for his efforts to pull Turkey away from its long and deep-rooted Ottoman influences. In WWII, Turkey remained relatively neutral until joining forces with the Allies in 1945.

The spread of Communism throughout Eastern Europe led to communist-backed violence in countries like Turkey and Greece after the war. Following the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Turkey was provided with massive economic and military assistance from the United States. It became a member of the United Nations in 1945, and a NATO member in 1952. Mustafa Kemal died prior to the war, so multi-party governments began after 1945, leading to political instability and military coups in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) created conflict with the representing government in the 1980’s, which resulted in civil instability that lasted until just a decade ago.

Contemporary Turkey finally began to show signs of stable leadership, largely thanks to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). They have been in power since 2002, promoting increasing economic development in recent years. Tourism plays an important role in modern Turkey, which has shown an annual growth rate of nine percent per year. Roman sites, like the Aspendos Theater (Aspendos, Serik, Antalya Province), and Ottoman structures, such as the Blue Mosque (Torun Sokak 19, Istanbul) are still some of the busiest attractions in Turkey.

Culture

Modern Turkey’s cultural diversity is just as fascinating as the ancient landmarks that dot the country’s landscape. A host of foreign influences have created a dynamic blend of east and west, reflecting their unique position on both the Asian and European continents. The early Roman times, Ottoman Empirical control and steady 20th century immigration from the Balkans, Greece and other European destinations have all helped shape modern Turkey.

There are two things that seem to unite all Turkish citizens. The first is faith, and the second is football. A majority of locals are Muslims, but variations and levels of Islam are found across the region. Football is almost as important when it comes to local culture. Turkish people follow the sport closely, and the country even boasts a very competitive professional league.


Turkey’s Presence in Northern Syria: A Caring Brother Acting in its Own Self-interest

Mohammed Abdullatif Published on December 19, 2018

Turkish-backed Syrian fighters train in a camp in the Aleppo countryside, northern Syria, on December 16, 2018. Photo AFP

Where does the rebuilding of daily life end and the ‘turkification’ of Syrian society begin? That seems to be the central question when assessing what the Turkish state is doing in the areas of northern Syria under its control. To make that more concrete with an example: nobody can object to the re-opening of a hospital in the town of Jarablus, but what are the portraits of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan doing on the walls?

It is not only the Turkish military and its armed affiliates that have become dominant in several areas of northern Syria, Turkish companies and the Turkish state have also established a strong presence. This was kicked off by the Turkish army’s first cross-border operation in the summer of 2016, when the border town of Jarablus was captured from Islamic State (IS). Turkey has since expanded its influence westwards. Its last conquest early in 2018 was Afrin in the northwestern corner of Syria, which has been occupied by Turkey and its proxies ever since.

Turkey has so far remained on the western side of the Euphrates river. The eastern side is ruled by the Kurdish YPG and its political arm the PYD, supported by the United States (US) in its ongoing efforts to neutralize IS. Recently, however, Erdogan has stepped up his rhetoric, announcing an operation east of the river “within days”. Due to the US presence east of the Euphrates, a large-scale operation is not possible, as journalist Amberin Zaman explains. However, smaller cross-border actions are likely, maybe in towns where the US army is not present like Tal-Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. This makes the question of whether Turkey is ‘turkifying’ the border regions and if so, to what extent, even more pressing.

Internet and Post Offices

Turkish construction companies have started to rebuild destroyed houses and other buildings, mobile internet providers have set up antennas to provide their services and teachers from Turkey have taken jobs in Syrian schools. In some towns, clocks have even been set to Turkish time, the residents now living an hour behind their fellow Syrians.

Turkey has not been secretive about its activities in the areas under its control. It has taken groups of international journalists across the border to show off its efforts to rebuild destroyed houses and neighbourhoods, to re-open schools and hospitals and to start services with Turkish brands, like internet and post offices. One report, by France24, showed a school in Syria that has been dedicated to the victims of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016. Turkish newspapers, especially those with English-language websites, are also contributing to the picture that Erdogan wants to paint of Turkey’s presence on Syrian soil: that of a caring older brother, tirelessly and altruistically helping people get back on their feet.

Sources: Wikipedia, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, liveuaemap.com, TRT World. @Fanack.com

While few would argue against the importance of children being able to go back to school, of hospitals functioning and of the police being trained, the question arises of how altruistic Turkey really is. What is its interest in the region?

This interest is first and foremost military. There is another military power in Syria, and it is no coincidence that this is Turkey’s archenemy: the PYD and its military wing the YPG and YPJ (women’s units). They share an ideology and a leader with the PKK, the armed Kurdish movement that has been at war with the Turkish state since 1984. Turkey finds the presence of ‘Öcalan fighters’ along its border unacceptable. It also claims the presence of IS in the border region was problematic, although this is doubtful. When Turkey first crossed the Syrian border in the summer of 2016, IS was already weakening. A weakened IS, Turkey knew, could no longer control the further expansion of the PYD and the YPG/J. Turkey thus took over that task.

This was just a tactical move. By also investing in the region administratively and commercially, Turkey is serving a longer-term strategic goal: to enhance the country’s influence in the region and in Syria specifically, as a force working against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom Turkey has wanted to see removed from power since the beginning of the uprisings in 2011. This expansionist desire is inspired by the vast territories controlled by what was then the Ottoman Empire, the grandeur of which Erdogan is keen to revive. Commercial and cultural dependency on Turkey helps to further that goal.

Last but not least, Turkey hopes that by helping life return to normal in at least some parts of the war-torn country, some of the more than 3 million Syrian refugees can be convinced to return home. A town like Jarablus, which has working schools, hospitals, internet and electricity, does indeed have appeal, if the official numbers are correct: the population has grown from 5,000 residents under IS to at least 140,000 today, a number that includes both returnees from Turkey and internally displaced Syrians.

Former Colonizer

Meanwhile, a lot remains unclear about the extent of Turkey’s efforts to recreate parts of north Syria in its own image.

Education offers an interesting example. Turkey has supplied school books and teachers who speak Arabic. The fact that children now also learn Turkish instead of French, as used to be the case in all Syrian schools, could also be considered logical, as this article by France24 makes clear. Isn’t it more useful to know the language of the current influential northern neighbour than that of the former colonizer? Yet this begs other questions. What about local languages in the curriculum, like Aramaic and Kurdish? And how much influence did the Turkish state have on the content of the school books it supplied? In other words, what are children under Turkish rule in Syria learning?

Turkey’s actions show an interesting contradiction in its Syria policies. After all, ever since the beginning of the Syrian war and especially since the Kurds started building their autonomous regions in the north of Syria, Turkey has warned against the disintegration of its southern neighbour. Syrian unity was to be respected at all times. Turkey’s fear of self-rule for the Kurds in a post-war Syria, which could further embolden the Kurdish movement at home, runs deep, since it undermines the strength of the state. Apparently, ‘turkifying’ parts of Syria is not considered to be a nail in Syria’s coffin.

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